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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Adverse Possession-Effect of Tenant's Attornment to True Owner
In a recent decision, it was held that a tenant's attornment to the
true owner of land which was held adversely by tenant's lessor, did not
interrupt the running of the statute in favor of the adverse possessor,
when the true owner had no notice of the tenancy relationship.' The
court based its opinion on the principles that the possession of the tenant
is the possession of the landlord and that a tenant is estopped to deny the
title of the landlord.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined adverse possession
as: "actual possession, with an intent to hold solely for the possessor to
the exclusion of others, and is denoted by the exercise of acts of dominion
over the land, in making the ordinary use and taking the ordinary profits
of which it is susceptible in its present state, such acts to be so repeated
as to show that they are done in the character of owner, in opposition
to right or claim of any other person, and not merely an occasional tres-
pass. It must be as decided and notorious as the nature of the land will
permit, affording unequivocal indication to all persons that he is exer-
cising thereon the dominion of owner."'2 Adverse possession consists of
five essential elements: (1) the possession must be hostile and under
claim of right; (2) it must be actual; (3) it must be open and notorious;
(4) it must be exclusive; and (5) it must be continuous. 3 If any one
of these elements is lacking, the holding will not be effective to allow
acquisition of title by adverse possession.
One holding land adversely may do so through his tenant, and the
possession of the tenant will be the possession of the landlord.4 How-
'Kimble v. Willey, 204 F. 2d 238 (8th Cir. 1953). A was record owner of
property in controversy. B, in 1930, acquired title by deed from holder of a void
tax deed, which at best, could serve only as color of title. B leased the land to C
for one year for $1.00 with the proviso that any holding over by C would be a
holding for B. In 1931, while the original term was still in effect, C solicited and
obtained a lease from A.
2 Locklear v. Savage, 159 N. C. 236, 237, 74 S. E. 347, 348 (1912). In North
Carolina, the statutes provide that one holding land adversely, may acquire title
after twenty years uninterrupted holding, or after seven years uninterrupted holding
under color of title. [N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-38, 40 (1953)]. Other states have
similar statutes with varying time limits. ARK. STAT. § 37-101 (1947), pleaded by
defendant in the principal case, provides that no suit may be maintained for pos-
session of lands after seven years adverse holding.
SBelatti v. Bickhart, 228 N. Y. 296, 127 N. E. 239 (1920) ; Newkirk v. Porter,
237 N. C. 115, 74 S. E. 2d 235 (1952) ; III Am. LAw OF PROPERTY, § 15.3 (1952).
' Howell v. Baskins, 213 Ark. 665, 212 S. W. 2d 353 (1948) ; Fugl v. Edwards,
96 Cal. App. 2d 460, 215 P. 2d 802 (1950) ; Kellogg v. Huffman, 137 Cal. App.
278, 30 P. 2d 593 (1934) ; Walker v. Bell, 154 Neb. 221, 47 N. W. 2d 504 (1951)
Jackson v. Gallegos, 38 N. M. 211, 30 P. 2d 719 (1934) ; Cook v. Winter, 207 S. W.
2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) ; Note, 30 MicHa L. REv. 429 (1932).
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ever, the elements of adverse possession must still be present. If, then,
the tenant voluntarily attorns5 to the true owner of the land, is not one
of the essential elements destroyed? Voluntary attornment by the lessee
of an adverse possessor to the record title holder would seem to divest
the holding of its hostile character. 6
If the holding is to constitute an effective adverse possession, it must
be continuous and uninterrupted on the part of the adverse claimant.
Where a tenant who purports to be holding and acting for his landlord
voluntarily attorns to the true owner, it would seem that this act would
break the continuity of the holding.
7
The court, in the instant case, relied on the principle that a tenant
is estopped to deny his landlord's title and applied it to a situation where
the tenant voluntarily attorned to the true owner and where the true
owner had no notice of the tenancy relationship.
In actions in ejectment or for collection of rent, there can be little
doubt that the doctrine of estoppel as to tenants is sound," and the courts
' Attornment has been variously defined as: ". . . the act of recognizing a new
landlord. The word comes from a feudal law, where it signifies the transfer by
the act of the lord with the consent of the tenant of all service, and homage of the
tenant to some new lord who had acquired the estate." [Willis v. Moore, 59 Tex.
628, 636 (1883)] ". . . an acknowledgment or agreement by the tenant that the
freehold is in another or that such person is his landlord." [Foster v. Morris, 10 Ky.
610, 611 (1821)] ".... the acknowledgment by a tenant that he holds under a new
lord who claims by title paramount, and not by grant of the reversion or as privy
to the reversioner." [Rochester Say. Bank v. Stoeltzer & Tapper, 176 Misc. 147,
26 N. Y. S. 2d 713, 716 (Sup. Ct. 1941).] See also Hankins v. Smith, 103 Fla.
892, 138 So. 494 (1935) ; Snyder v. Bernstein Bros., 201 Iowa 931, 208 N. W. 503
(1926); Hemminger v. Klaproth, 15 N. J. Misc. 163, 189 Ati. 363 (C. P. 1937) ;
Del-New Co. v. James, 111 N. J. L. 157, 167 Atd. 747 (Sup. Ct. 1933) ; New York
Rys. Corp. v. Savoy Associates, 239 App. Div. 504, 268 N. Y. Supp. 181 (1st Dept.
1933); Commonwealth Mortgage Co. v. DeWaltoff, 135 App. Div. 33, 119 N. Y.
Supp. 781 (1st Dept. 1909).
'Thompson v. Pioche, 44 Cal. 508 (1872) ; Ross v. Dysart, 33 Pa. St. 452
(1859) ; Koons v. Steele, 19 Pa. 203 (1852) ; Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v.
Alexander, 154 S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
As to the proposition that a tenant's attornment to one holding paramount title
in order to avoid litigation is equivalent to an actual ouster, see: Charles Merryman
v. E. W. Bourne, 9 Wall. 592 (U. S. 1870); Benaiah Morse v. Silas Goddard, 13
Metc. 177 (Mass. 1847) ; Renshaw v. Reynolds, 317 Mo. 384, 297 S. W. 374 (1925) ;
In re O'Donnell, 240 N. Y. 99, 147 N. E. 541 (1925). See also III Am. LAW OF
PROPERTY § 15.9 (1952) : "But it is clear, of course, that an attornment to the true
owner by the tenant makes his possession that of such owner and therefore ends
the adverse possession."
Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Alexander, 154 S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913).
8 Because of the personal relationship of lord and tenant during the feudal system
and the method of land holding then in vogue, it was necessary, to save the lord the
expense and trouble of defending against disseisin, that a tenant not be allowed to
deny his lord's title and acknowledge another as his lord. The principle was made
statutory by 11 GEORGE II, c. 19, § 11 (1738) which provided that attornment to a
stranger should be void unless pursuant to a decree of court or with consent of the
lessor. [I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 3.65 (1952).]
In actions for collection of rent or for possession, where a tenant has acquired
possession of property, used it as his own without interference, and has received
what he bargained for, he should not be relieved of his obligations merely by being
[Vol. 32
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have so held in a substantial majority of the decided cases.9 But where
the action involves only the title to land, a different situation arises.
The purpose of the statutes concerning adverse possession is not to take
property away from the true owner and give it to an adverse claimant,
but to allow such an adverse claimant to acquire title to property which
he has possessed and used as his own for the required number of years
and which has been neglected by the true owner without any assertion
of his rights of ownership. 10
Numerous cases hold that an attornment by an adverse possessor's
tenant to a third party does not interrupt the running of the statute."
Few situations, however, have come before the courts wherein the true
owner had no notice of the tenancy relationship.
Generally, decisions on the question fall into three categories, wherein
courts have held: (1) that an attornment by a tenant to another party
does not interrupt the running of the statute in favor of tenant's lessor,
regardless of the question of notice ;12 (2) that such an attornment does
allowed to find flaws in his landlord's title and claim that his landlord does not
have title to the land. [Vernam v. Smith, 15 N. Y. 327 (Ct. of App. 1857) ; Marina-
duke v. McDonald, 51 P. 2d 484 (Okla. 1935).]
' Townsend Peyton v. Joseph Stith, 5 Pet. 485 (U. S. 1831) ; Rogers v. Boynton,
57 Ala. 501 (1877); Manusco v. Santucci, 60 A. 2d 697 (D. C. Mun. Ct. App.
1948); Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Spencer, 160 So. 175 (La. Ct. App.
1935); Renshaw v. Reynolds, 317 Mo. 384, 297 S. W. 374 (1925) ; Gies v. Storz
Brewing Co., 75 Neb. 698, 106 N. W. 775 (1906); Mosher v. Cole, 50 Neb. 636,
70 N. W. 275 (1897) ; Hobby v. Freeman, 183 N. C. 240, 111 S. E. 1 (1922) ;
Marmaduke v. McDonald, 51 P. 2d 484 (Okla. 1935) ; Stover v. Davis, 57 W. Va.
196, 49 S. E. 1023 (1905).
" Thompson v. Pioche, 44 Cal. 508 (1872) ; Johnson v. Szumowicz, 63 Wyo. 211,
179 P. 2d 1012 (1947) ; Sailor v. Hertzogg, 2 Barr 182 (Pa. 1845) ("The statute
protects the occupant, not for his merit, for he has none, but for the demerit of his
antagonist in delaying the contest beyond the period assigned for it, when papers
may be lost, facts forgotten, or witnesses dead.") See also 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROP-
ERTY, § 1134 (3d Ed. 1939).
"' Kepley v. Scully, 185 Ill. 52, 57 N. E. 187 (1900) ; Bailey v. Moore and Munn,
21 Ill. 165 (1859) ; Clifton Heights Land Co. v. Randell, 82 Iowa 89, 47 N. W.
905 (1891) ; Ellsworth v. Eslick, 91 Kan. 287, 137 Pac. 973 (1914) ; Turner v.
Thomas, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 518 (1877); Hayes v. Boardman, 119 Mass. 414
(1876) ; Blanchard v. Tyler, 12 Mich. 339 (1864) ; Farrar v. Heinrich, 86 Mo. 521
(1885) ; Brown v. Dorough, 224 S. W. 2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Powell
Lumber Co. v. Nobles, 44 S. W. 2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; Louisiana & Texas
Lumber Co. v. Alexander, 154 S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
1' Kepley v. Scully, 185 Ill. 52, 57 N. E. 187 (1900) (attornee induced attornment
and facts indicate that he had full knowledge of tenancy) ; Bailey v. Moore and
Munn, 21 Ill. 165 (1859) (attornee acquired title by sheriff's deed subsequent to
tenant's entry for landlord, court holding tenant could not attorn to one acquiring
a title hostile to that of landlord) ; Clifton Heights Land Co. v. Randell, 82 Iowa
89, 47 N. W. 905 (1891) (attornee aware of tenancy) ; Ellsworth v. Eslick, 91
Kan. 287, 137 Pac. 973 (1914) (no indication that owner was aware of tenancy) ;
Turner v. Thomas, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 518 (1877) (attornment made as result of
inducement by attornee who claimed under tax deed held to be invalid) ; Hayes v.
Boardman, 119 Mass. 414 (1876) (no indication of whether attornee knew of
tenancy); Blanchard v. Tyler, 12 Mich. 339 (1864) (attornment by tenant to
party acquiring hostile title held of no effect. There attornee was advised by tenant
of his tenancy.) Farrar v. Heinrich, 86 Mo. 521 (1885) ; Louisiana & Texas Lum-
ber Co. v. Alexander, 154 S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) (where the court,
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interrupt the running of the statute;13 and (3) that such an attornment
interrupts the running of the statute if the true owner had no notice of
the tenancy relationship.'
4
It would seem that the distinction recognized by this third group of
cases would tend to create an exception to the general rule that a tenant
is estopped to deny his landlord's title.' 5
This would seem to follow, for where there is no evidence that the
true owner has neglected his title or abandoned the property, and it
comes to his attention that the property is occupied by one who volun-
tarily takes a lease from him or acknowledges his paramount title, the
owner is not charged with more knowledge of the situation than could
be inferred from the very fact of the possession or ascertained by reason-
able inquiry.1
feeling that evidence was clear that plaintiff's agent was fully aware of the tenancy
relationship, said: "We are not prepared to say that this rule (that the continuity
of possession of an adverse'claimant is not broken by the attornment of his tenant
to another without his knowledge or consent) should apply where the attornment
is to the owner of the property and is obtained without any notice that the person
in possession, who makes the attornment, is holding under one claiming adversely
to him. In order to perfect his title by limitation, the adverse claimant of land
must give continuous notice of his claim by a visible occupancy and appropriation
of the land for the time prescribed by statute. He must in this way keep his flag
continuously flying; and while he may do this by tenant, if such tenant lowers the
flag by attorning to the owner, who acts in good faith and without notice that the
person in possession who attorns to him, is the tenant of the adverse claimant, it
may be that such attornment would break the continuity of the adverse claimant's
possession. It would seem that in such case the owner has done all that could be
required of him to protect his possession, and that the adverse claimant, who trusted
his tenant to assert his claim for him, should suffer the consequences of his agent's
infidelity."); Powell Lumber Co. v. Nobles, 44 S. W. 2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931)
(citing and quoting with approval Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Alexander,
this note supra).
"3 Western Union Beef Co. v. Thurman, 70 Fed. 960 (5th Cir. 1895) ; Kaempfer
v. Zeller, 28 F. Supp. 699 (W. D. La. 1938) ; Van Deventer v. Lott, 172 Fed. 574
(E. D. N. Y. 1909), aff'd. 180 Fed. 378 (2d Cir. 1910) ; Russell v. Erwin's Admr.,
38 Ala. 44 (1861) ; De Forest v. Walters, 47 N. E. 297 (N. Y. Ct. App. 1897) ;
Koons v. Steele, 19 Pa. St. 203 (1852) ; Frank C. Schilling Co. v. Detry, 203 Wis.
109, 233 S. W. 635 (1930).
"4 Thompson v. Pioche, 44 Cal. 508 (1872); Turpin v. Saunders, 32 Grat. 27
(Va. 1879) (the court said: "It is but fair to presume that if Cecil had been in-
formed that Simpkins was Saunders' tenant, he would at once have taken necessary
steps to protect his own rights.") But cf. Powell Lumber Co. v. Nobles, 44 S. W.
2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Alexander, 154
S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
" Such a distinction is suggested in 4 TIFFANY, REAL PRoPzavR, § 1168 (3d ed.
1939) (". . . in a few cases it has been decided that it (tenant's acknowledgment
of true owner's title) causes such interruption if the rightful owner does not know
of the relation of tenancy. These latter cases would seem to indicate the proper
distinction in this regard. If the rightful owner has no reason to suspect that the
person wrongfully in possession of his land is so in possession, not in his own behalf,
but in behalf of another, he is justified in assuming that the person in possession
has full power to characterize his possession as being hostile or the reverse, and if
such person acknowledges the true owner's title, the latter is not guilty of laches
in failing to take legal proceedings."). See also, 2 C. J. S., Adverse Possession,
§159 (1936).
" See, E.g., Hulvey v. Hulvey, 92 Va. 182, 23 S. E. 233 (1895), where the court
said: "No one is required to watch the clerk's office to see that those in possession
[Vol. 32
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The situation in the principal case has not come before the North
Carolina courts. However, the North Carolina court has consistently
held that a tenant cannot deny his landlord's title.' 7 Further, in Wise v.
Wheeler,"' the court held as inadmissible in evidence the testimony of a
tenant against his landlord in an action for possession instituted against
the tenant where the landlord was substituted as defendant. In the case
of Lawrence v. Eller,9 the court, by way of dictum, said: "It has been
said that the estoppel referred to does not prevail in actions involving
an issue as to title, but if such a limitation on the general rule prevails
in this jurisdiction, it applies only to actions involving strictly the issue
as to title, and does not extend to those where the possession and the
right growing out of or incident to it are presented or in any way
affected."
2 0
Where the true owner evidences his ownership by giving a lease to
the only person he knows to be holding without authority from him and
has no notice that the tenant is holding in behalf of another claiming
adversely to the owner, it would seem that justice and a fair interpreta-
tion of the law would not deprive the owner of his title.
2 1
The view, expressed by the dissenting opinion in the principal case,
22
that an attornment to the true owner by the tenant of an adverse pos-
sessor, where the true owner has no notice of the tenancy relationship,
interrupts the running of the statute in favor of the adverse possessor,
seems practical and just. If the true owner is aware of the tenancy
of property in privity with him or in subordination to his title are not (sic) acquir-
ing rights adverse to him," and Thompson v. Pioche, 44 Cal. 508 (1872), where, to
the contention that the possession of the tenant was notice of the title of his land-
lord, the court replied that such possession was not of itself notice, but that it was
sufficient to put a person dealing with the property upon inquiry and that it would
be proof of notice, unless it be shown that the inquiry, after having been pursued
with due diligence, did not disclose the title of the person in possession.
"7 Lassiter v. Stell, 214 N. C. 391, 199 S. E. 409 (1938) ; Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am. v. Totten, 203 N. C. 431, 166 S. E. 316 (1932) ; Hobby v. Freeman, 183
N. C. 240, 111 S. E. 1 (1922); Lawrence v. Eller, 169 N. C. 211, 85 S. E. 291
(1915) ; State v. Howell, 107 N. C. 835, 12 S. E. 569 (1890) ; Springs v. Schenck,
99 N. C. 551, 6 S. E. 405 (1888) ; Clapp v. Coble, 21 N. C. 177 (1835) ; Belfour's
Heirs v. Davis, 20 N. C. 443 (1839).
's28 N. C. 196 (1845). See also STANSBURy ON EVIDENCE, § 175 (1946)
("Statements by a devisee are not competent as admissions against other devisees
since their interests are not joint .... and the same is true of admissions of a tenant
offered against his landlord.")169 N. C. 211, 85 S. E. 291 (1915).
2' Lawrence v. Eller, 169 N. C. 211, 215, 85 S. E. 291, 292 (1915). See also
Prud. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Totten, 203 N. C. 431, 166 S. E. 316 (1932)."1 Note, 5 ALA. L. REv. 123 (1952), where the writer in commenting on Kimble
v. Willey, 198 F. 2d 812 (8th Cir. 1952) said: "In the instant case, the tenant, in
effect perpetrated a fraud on each of the principal parties. The rule here laid
down is intended to protect the record owner as against the adverse possessor where
the equities of the parties are substantially equal. Had the plaintiff had any actual
notice of the presence of an adverse claimant, and then failed to act on such notice,
the adverse claimant would have properly prevailed."
2 Kimble v. Willey, 204 F. 2d 238, 243 (8th Cir. 1953).
19531
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relationship, his failure to resort to legal process to protect his title is
sufficient to indicate his acquiescence in the adverse possession. The
fact that he gives the tenant a lease when unaware of any other tenancy
relationship, rather than resort to legal process, should not operate to
deprive him of his legal title. To allow this result would seem to give
an unfair supremacy to the relationship of landlord and tenant to the
detriment of the holder of the legal title and would seem to be contrary
to the purpose and reason for statutes allowing the acquisition of title to
property by adverse possession.
NAOMI E. MORRIS
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Admissibility of Confessions
The decision in the "Reader's Digest Murder Case,"' recently handed
down by the United States Supreme Court, presents quite a dilemma
to state courts in their determination of the admissibility of confessions.
In a line of decisions beginning at least as early as 1936,2 the Supreme
Court has set aside as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment convictions in which "third degree" methods were
used to extract confessions from the accused.
3
The common law principle of exclusion of involuntary confessions
rested on the theory that they were untrustworthy testimony; that the
accused may have given an untrue confession to avoid or end present
pain and coercion. 4 A new test of what constitutes an involuntary con-
fession has evolved in the last decade and, until the decision in the
principal case, appeared to be becoming an established principle of con-
stitutional law. While this test is not enunciated in any case as a uniform
' Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077 (1953). The case rose to the Supreme
Court on writ of certiorari after the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed con-
viction. 303 N. Y. 856, 104 N. E. 2d 917 (1952).
'Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936). Involuntary confessions were
excluded by federal courts on the ground that they were in violation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as far back as the leading case of
Brai v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897). Judicial thinking tended then to
consider involuntary confessions only in the light of the self-incrimination clause
of the Fifth Amendment which, of course, was inapplicable to the states. But as
Chief Justice Hughes said in Brown v. Mississippi: "Compulsion by torture to ex-
tort a confession is a different matter. The state is free to regulate the procedure
of its courts in accordance with its own conceptions of policy, unless in so doing it
offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.. . . The freedom of the state in establishing
its policy is the freedom of constitutional government and is limited by the require-
ment of due process of law." 297 U. S. 278, 285 (1936).
'Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940) ; White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530
(1940) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944) ; Malinski v. New York, 324
U. S. 401 (1945) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948) ; Watts v. Indiana, 338
U. S. 49 (1949) ; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U. S. 62 (1949) ; Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U. S. 68 (1949) ; Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 U. S. 881 (1951) (per
curiam).
'3 WiGcoR, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
[Vol. 32
